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Abstract
Energy and water are key instruments for agricultural production and their interlinkages
pose significant management challenges. Lack of appropriate energy policy and policy to
deal with management of groundwater has not only contributed to over-exploitation of
groundwater; it has also resulted into a nexus. Perverse incentives provided as part of the
energy policies have led to economic inefficiency in the performance of the electricity
utilities, playing havoc with the energy economy of the country and viability of the energy
sector. Analyzing the growth in use of groundwater and energy for pumping coincides with
India’s overall development policy of attaining food security. However, much of the debate
on water- energy nexus as an indirect approach for groundwater management has focused
on the energy side of the nexus, ignoring the role of agriculture policy, especially those
dealing with gaps in market linkages for agricultural products and role of minimum
support price, which have greater influence on farmer’s choice of cropping pattern and
hence excessive groundwater use. Policies governing agriculture and energy are apparently
dictated more by political populism rather than sound management strategies for sustainable
resources development. Combined effect of these policies has resulted in the hydrological
unsustainable over-exploitation of groundwater. In this paper, the authors argue that there
is need to further the debate on water-energy nexus beyond the realms of those focused
primarily on energy policies.
Introduction
Despite a decade and half of economic reforms in India, agriculture remains
the backbone of the economy and a direct and indirect source of livelihood for
India’s vast rural population. The recent estimates show that the agriculture sector
accounts for 22% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and provides livelihoods
to 58% of the population (584 million people, GoI, 2004). In fact, energy (electricity)
and water (irrigation) have emerged as key determinants of economic growth and
social development in the rural areas in India.
Groundwater has become the mainstay of irrigated agriculture in India. Energy,
especially electricity, has contributed significantly to the development andUnderstanding and Managing the Water–Energy Nexus 243
exploitation of groundwater resources, improving productivity and providing
livelihood and food security (Shah et al., 2003). While energy and water have
strengthened economic opportunities in rural areas and ensured food security,
these are also threatening this very livelihood option. Groundwater resources in
India are largely unmanaged, resulting in high possibility for its over-exploitation,
thus threatening people’s livelihoods and endangered drinking water supplies.
This is further aided by energy policies and perverse incentives created by energy
subsidies, inefficient electricity distribution system involving unreliable, poor quality
and restricted hours of supply. Lack of appropriate energy policy has not only
indirectly contributed to overexploitation of groundwater, creating a water-energy
nexus, the energy policies have also, resulted in economic inefficiency of electricity
utilities (State Electricity Boards), playing havoc with the energy economy of the
country and seriously affecting the viability and reform process of the energy
sector.
Much of the debate on managing the water – energy nexus has focused on
intervening on the energy side of the nexus as an indirect tool for arresting the
depletion of groundwater, which is addressing only half of the problem (Shah et.
al., 2003; Sharma et. al., 2005). The indirect approach in energy policy has a
technocratic bias, rather than the appreciation of the other side of the problem, the
associated policy issues and political nature of the problem. Energy policy
intervention, especially those policy measures initiated since electricity sector
reforms have focused on either economic – raising electricity tariff for agriculture
users – and/or technical – installing meters and doing demand side management
to improve the pump set efficiency. The standard electricity reforms prescriptions
have witnessed little buy-in from the farmers, as well as politicians. While individual
farmers have opposed metering; collective action, and lobbying by farmer’s groups
have been effective in blocking tariff increase and payment of arrears. These
collective actions of farmers have also found support from the political groups,
who have used the means of waiver of dues and subsidized to free power as an
instrument for rural development and to win farmer’s vote.
Energy and water are key instruments for agricultural production. Irrespective
of the changes in the energy policy, the demand for groundwater depends upon
what farmers grow, which in turn is influenced by the support price policy,
agriculture (food security) policy, and, market linkages. Government policies in the
agriculture sector are multi-faceted and inadvertently encourage the production of
water intensive crops over more water efficient commodities. Indian agriculture
suffers from a mismatch between food crops and cash crops. Domestic production
of pulses and oilseeds are still much below the domestic requirements. A distinct
bias in agriculture price support policies in favor of rice and wheat has distorted
cropping pattern and utilization of different inputs. Besides this, market for farm
produces continues to be dominated by heavy procurement interventions by the
government agencies.
Analyzing the growth in use of groundwater and energy for pumping coincides
with India’s overall development policy of attaining food security through Green
Revolution technologies. The nexus that is visible today is due to the fact these
policies did not change with time. That brings to another external factor – political
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in the late seventies and early eighties. The farmer’s movement in southern states
of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu brought the political intervention of free
power. Almost parallel movement of farm lobby in northern and western India
brought more subsidies in the agriculture sector in form of inputs and minimum
support price for food crop procurement. Combined impact of these policies has
affected the water and energy sectors. Breaking the nexus would require not just
policy changes at the level of farm input subsidies, but also a realistic and strategic
shift from minimum support price policy, and developing alternate product
markets essential for crop diversification.
Water – Energy Nexus: Moving Beyond the Energy Debate
Water – energy nexus in India is a result of policy issues such as those dealing
with groundwater, agriculture, and energy. Rapid development of high intensity of
pump sets of smaller capacities scattered throughout the landscape makes water –
energy nexus peculiar. Yet, another feature of the nexus is the existence of
groundwater markets, where especially the small and marginal farmers depend
upon the pump owners to buy water. Groundwater resources are largely unmanaged
and the policies needed to deal with the problem are not yet in place. Agricultural
policies, especially the procurement policies are such that they have encouraged
farmers to continue growing more water intensive crops (rice, sugarcane etc.).
Energy policies and economic incentives (or disincentives) for use of electricity for
groundwater extraction, has resulted in almost zero incremental cost for the
farmers. At the same time, inefficient electricity distribution system involving
restricted hours of supply, with unreliable and poor quality has resulted in long
hours of pumping by the electric pump owners.
The existing discussion on water energy nexus, attempts to capture a simple
linear causal relationship between water and energy sector, as shown by the
bottom part of the triangle in Figure 1. The causal effect for the energy-water nexus
is not just due to inadequate energy policy or groundwater policy or the absence
of any linkage between the two sector issues. Uncertainty of monsoon and existence
of groundwater markets add further stress to the groundwater resources. This is a
vicious cycle from the groundwater sector perspective. Energy sector policies
provide electricity at a very low cost for agriculture and contribute to the socio-
economic development of the rural areas. Due to shortages in electricity generation,
and almost negligible return from supplying electricity to farmers (low/ nil tariff,
non-payment), the utilities restrict the supply hours and provide it during off-peak
hours. Lack of investments in strengthening the supply infrastructure by the
utilities often results in frequent breakdowns and burnouts. Dispersed nature of
electricity connections, means very little monitoring, and allows pilferages. This
results in a vicious cycle, which the farmers mitigate by pumping for all the hours
supply of electricity is available and in the process affecting the groundwater
resources. These two vicious cycles are considered as the cause of the nexus. The
nexus is complicated further by policies related to those of the agriculture and
trade and procurement support policies, which influence the choice of crops
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Broadly, there are two approaches to arrest depletion of groundwater – direct
and indirect. The direct approach for groundwater management has largely failed,
as access to groundwater is through right of capture and the number of users is
simply too large for effecting any regulations. In fact, despite being a common
resource, inability to manage groundwater is a classical failure of common property
resource management. In the absence of any effective legislation for groundwater
management, indirect approach through energy policy intervention has been
considered as an alternate option.
Energy policy as an indirect tool for groundwater management has twin
advantages: one, it can be effective in arresting groundwater overexploitation, and,
two, it will also lead to economic viability of the energy sector. The energy sector
policies have focused either on technical solution of metering and demand side
management, or through economic instruments of electricity tariff revisions. The
policy prescriptions have emerged since the on-set of energy sector reforms, which
views electricity supply to agriculture and poor recoveries as key factor for poor
performance of electricity utilities in India. However, energy policy interventions
have limitations, and given the standard prescription, they are more likely to
benefit electricity utilities, than either the farmers or arresting groundwater depletion.
It is therefore in context of these issues, that these energy policy interventions have
seen little buy-in from the farmers (Dubash, 2005).
Given the limitation of the changes in energy policy, there is a need to look at
the problem from a holistic perspective. Energy and groundwater are inputs to
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support agriculture development and improving farm productivity. In fact, choice
of crops by farmers are not determined alone by the quality and economic cost of
different inputs such as electricity, but, the economic returns, market demand for
commodities, and market linkages are dominant factors. The debate on water –
energy nexus would remain incomplete and lead to inconclusive solutions, without
looking at the role of agriculture sector policies.
Adding the agriculture component to the nexus as shown in Fig.1 modifies the
water-energy nexus. The schematic diagram shows that there is a vicious cycle
operating within-water, energy, and agriculture sectors - creating a nexus. In the
absence of effective groundwater legislation to control over-exploitation of
groundwater, and under the favorable condition of agriculture policy, which
emphasizes on production of food grains through procurement support, there is
excessive dependence on water intensive crops leading to depleting groundwater
levels and lack of crop diversification. Perverse incentives provided as part of the
energy policy coupled with poor quality and un-reliable electricity supply has
resulted in long hours of pumping and leading to wastage of both energy as well
as groundwater. Implementation of policies in the agriculture and energy sectors,
have resulted in misguided targeting, as benefits of the agriculture subsidies are
captured by agriculturally prosperous states and benefits of electricity subsidy are
mostly retained by rich farmers, instead of poor states and small/marginal farmers.
Although Figure 1 shows the internal vicious cycles between agriculture, water
and energy sectors, it does not show the coping mechanisms that farmers adopt in
light of inefficient power supply. Rapid growth in groundwater wells is largely
because of unreliable power supply. When power fails, the additional wells would
have pumped enough to meet the requirements. When pump fails, the additional
wells would be used to fill in. Surveys in Andhra Pradesh and Haryana also
showed that most of the large and medium farmers had more than two wells per
farmer. These are the ones that have the capacity to invest in additional wells and
benefit from energy subsidies. The coping mechanisms adopted by the farmers add
to increased pressures on both energy and water (Sharma et.al, 2005).
Groundwater
Groundwater irrigation developed towards early 1960s in India, and expanded
rapidly after 1969 with the expansion of grid electricity to rural areas. At present,
groundwater supplies water to 70% of the irrigated area (Shah et al., 2003). Over
the last two decades, 84% of the total addition to the net irrigated area came from
groundwater, and only 16% from canals (Figure 2). As it can be seen from the
Figure 2, the net irrigated area by groundwater is about  twice the area irrigated
by the canals.
The current dependence on groundwater irrigation started as a viable alternate
option largely due to certain critical changes that took place in the Indian agriculture
and irrigation sectors. Surface irrigation sources such as canals and tanks required
massive public investment and complex institutional set-up. Over the years public
investments in irrigation infrastructure has declined and simultaneously the surface
irrigation source suffer from poor maintenance leading to deterioration in quality
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With India’s demand for food security becoming the primary objective of
agriculture development, the demand for groundwater irrigation increased.
Groundwater irrigation was also considered as a viable technical option to reduce
water logging and salinity in certain areas of river basins. For the farmers,
groundwater provided flexible option of applying right quantities of water when
needed. Groundwater irrigation received further fillip due to increased availability
of irrigation pump sets at affordable prices and ease in access to subsidized credit.
Groundwater exploitation in India has contributed to irrigation, poverty
reduction, and rural development benefits. However, its utilization pattern and
heavy dependence have raised sustainability concerns. Groundwater estimates
indicate that more than 9% of the administrative blocks/watersheds/talukas are
over-exploited, and nearly 5% of them are in critical stage (Romani, 2005). These
estimates are based on assessment conducted around 1999. The situation has
aggravated since then. For example in Karnataka, the 1999 estimates identified a
Doddaballapura  taluka as “safe” and only parts of the taluka  were semi-critical
(GoK, 2004). However, the recent assessment by the state government department
shows that the entire taluka has now been classified as “critical”(Venugopal, 2005).
The change in the availability of groundwater in this area has been largely due to
increase in number of bore wells, increase in depth of bore wells, and poor
maintenance of tanks. Anecdotal evidence from the area also suggests that the well
failure rate is extremely high, and existing bore wells have started to dry.
Agriculture
Agriculture has been the mainstay of the economy and its growth is pre-
requisite for economic and social development of the Indian economy. As noted
earlier, agriculture sector accounts for 22% of the GDP, but at the same time, it
supports livelihoods of 58% of the population. The Xth Five Year Plan (FYP) has
targeted an average annual growth rate of the agriculture sector at 4 per cent
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(Planning Commission, 2002b). However, monsoon plays a critical role in the
growth rate of the sector. Severe drought in 2002 resulted in negative (-7.0 per cent)
growth rate, as deficient rainfall significantly affects Kharif (rainy season) food
grain production (GoI, 2005a).
Post independence growth of agriculture owes much to the conscious and
proactive government policy to promote agricultural productivity and overall
development. These could be largely ascribed to measures such as public investments
in irrigation, rural electrification, research and development and transfer of
knowledge to field to improve crop productivity, development of credit networks
and extension services, guaranteed support prices for outputs and subsidized
inputs. Annual growth rate of 2.7% for all crops achieved during 1949-1995 was
considerably higher than insignificant growth of 0.3% per annum registered during
the first half of the century. Accordingly, food grain production has grown from
50.8 million tonnes in 1950-51 to about 212 million tonnes in 2001-02.
However, in striving to achieve food security, the basic principle of rational
pricing and sustainable management of natural resources were neglected in India.
The magnitude of un-recovered costs on subsidized inputs has been rising at a
much faster rate than public investment in the sector. Apart from rising input
subsidies, subsidy provided by the government as output subsidy in the form of
food subsidy has also been increasing and contributing to the rising subsidy bill for
the government. Food subsidy in India comprises of subsidies to farmers through
support price and purchase operation of the Food Corporation of India (FCI),
consumer subsidies through the public distribution system, and subsidies to FCI to
cover all its costs. Food subsidies are mainly on account of food grains - paddy and
wheat - both being water intensive crops and rely on groundwater.
Food subsidy, especially the minimum support price (MSP) has asserted in
improving food security through affordable prices for the consumers and incentives
to the farmers in form of assured market and thus keep food grains production at
a comfortable level. However, these policy measures have also created a lock-in
situation, where food grains production dominates and domestic production of
other cereal crops and oil seeds have suffered because of food security. Analyzing
the food subsidy bills in India for the period between 1990-91 and 2003-04, shows
a ten times increase in the food subsidy (Table 1). In 1990-91, the food subsidy was
Rs 245 billion (1 USD ~ INR 45) and it increased to Rs. 2580 billion in 2003-04. In
fact, after 1994-95, the annual growth in the food subsidy bill has registered a
growth, due to increase in MSP and open-ended procurement. Food subsidy is
further increased by the low off-take of food grains for distribution and build-up
stocks.
Higher food subsidy bill in the last five years has been on the account of open-
ended procurement policy with no upper bounds on procurement levels. Under
this procurement scheme, the government buys whatever is offered to it at the
‘going’ MSP. Analyzing the food subsidies in India indicates that a large part of the
recent problems arise from the relatively high MSPs (Table 2). Not only the MSP
is higher, it is also at levels higher than the price recommended by the Commission
on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP). The declared MSP has had several
negative fallouts. Significant from the water-energy nexus perspective, is the fact
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farmers in the favor of these two food grains alone. The higher water intensity of
these two crops in turn has had adverse environmental impacts.
The other negative impact of the MSP is the inequitable distribution of
subsidies due to concentration of procurement in just two food grains and selected
states. In 2003-04, nearly 95% of the wheat was procured from Punjab, Haryana
and part of Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, nearly half of the paddy procurement was
from the states of Haryana and Punjab, followed by Andhra Pradesh and
Chattisgarh. Not only farmers in these selected states draw the benefits of the
Table 1. Growth of food subsidies in India
















Source: (Ministry of Finance, 2004).
Table 2. Minimum support price(MSP, Rs. per 100 kg) of wheat and paddy
Crop Year Paddy (Common) Wheat
MSP % Change MSP % Change
1990-91 205 225
1995-96 360 5.9 380 5.6
1996-97 380 5.6 475 25.0
1997-98 415 9.2 510 7.4
1998-99 440 6.0 550 7.8
1999-00 490 11.4 580 5.5
2000-01 510 4.1 610 5.2
2001-02 530 3.9 620 1.6
2002-03 530 — 620 —
2003-04 550 3.8 630 1.6
2004-05 560 1.8 640 1.6
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subsidies, within these states the large farmers, leaving out small and marginal
farmers, mostly enjoy these benefits. Study in Andhra Pradesh has shown that
farmers, notably small and marginal, face several hurdles in realizing the MSPs
offered by the government.
In summary, food subsidies have not only resulted in being mis-directed and
leading to wastage of subsidies, they are responsible for excessive dependence on
two food grains – paddy and wheat. This has not only affected the cropping
pattern, it has also resulted in over-exploitation of groundwater.
The Energy Angle
Improving access to electricity for social and economic development in the
rural areas has been the mainstay of the energy policy in India. Energisation of
irrigation pump sets was integral to the rural electrification program with the
objective of creating economic opportunities in the agriculture sector along with
creating agro-processing units. At the time of independence, there were
approximately 6500 irrigation pump sets. In the interim period of 1966-69, between
the IVth and the Vth FYPs, about one million pump sets were installed. However,
after 1969, there has been an exponential growth in number of energized pump sets
(Figure 3). As it can be seen from Figure 3, after 1969, the number of energized
pump sets has substantially increased during each plan period. This was possible
due to expansion of grid electricity in the rural areas, mostly on the back of multi-
purpose irrigation projects, easy availability of pump sets and affordable drilling
services in the market, access to subsidized credit, for realizing potential of
groundwater for irrigation. The trigger point was the consecutive years of drought
between 1966-68, which changed the face of Indian agriculture, irrigation, and role
of electricity in supporting irrigation and agriculture for attaining food security.
Figure 3. Progress in pump set energization in India 1947-2003 (Source: Sinha (2005)Understanding and Managing the Water–Energy Nexus 251
As it can be seen from Figure 3, 70% of the groundwater potential has already
been utilized. Groundwater estimates based on the available resources, indicate
that approximately 19 million pump sets can be installed in India. The decline in
pace of pump set energization in the last two Five Year Plans is largely due to
saturation in most of the agriculture prosperous states, denial of new pump-set
connections and subsidized credit in the ‘over-exploited’ or ‘critical’ administrative
units. In the states such as those in the eastern India, where high potential for
groundwater exploitation is possible, then these states are affected by low density
of rural electricity grid, poor availability of electricity supply, high incidence of
poverty making access to individual ownership of pump set difficult, and these
problems are further complicated by bureaucratic inefficiencies in these states.
The widespread increase in utilization of groundwater from 1970s onwards
was supported by incentives from the state electricity utilities through provision of
subsidized tariff. While 1970s were the peak period for rapid increase in groundwater
irrigation, two policy interventions in the energy sector during this period, resulted
in their over-exploitation in coming years. One intervention was in the form of
change in the billing of agriculture consumers. Agriculture consumers were billed
based on energy used as per the energy meter. The billing was changed to load-
based tariff (per horsepower [hp]) of the installed pump set capacity. Utilities felt
that the change was necessitated to reduce the transaction cost involved in meter
reading and bill distribution to the thousands of scattered pump set users in the
rural areas. The negative implication of such a move resulted in under-reporting of
pump set load used by the farmers, contributing to commercial losses for the
electricity utilities.
Second policy intervention came from the government as part of larger political
populism. Under pressure from rising farmer’s movements in parts of southern
Indian states, followed by similar movements in northern India, state governments
introduced highly subsidized tariff and subsequently many states offered free
electricity for the agriculture sector. Free electricity was introduced in Andhra
Pradesh towards the end of 1970s and was followed by Tamil Nadu and Punjab.
This political populism soon spread to other neighboring states.
The combined effect of these policy intervention resulted in poor performance
of state electricity utilities, which over a period due to under-recoveries, became
financially insolvent. While the agriculture sector share in total electricity sales
increased, revenue realization remained extremely low. As it can be seen from
Figure 4, during the period of 1994-95 and 2001-02, total sales of electricity to the
agriculture sector was more than 30%, but revenue realization was less than 5%
(Planning Commission, 2002a). The high commercial losses meant that the
investment by the utilities in electricity distribution infrastructure declined over the
years. As a result quality of power supply was characterized by low voltage and
frequent outages and reliability of supply further deteriorated. At the same time
power supply was scheduled during off-peak demands, therefore resulting in
supply during night time. Farmers coping mechanism to counter low voltage
power supply and frequent interruption during scheduled supply was to use phase
splitters to run pump sets from single-phase power supply. To counter the
nighttime power supply and unscheduled supply, farmers adopted auto-switch to
run pump sets. Implication of such pump set utilization pattern negatively affected
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Not only these policy interventions created unfavorable utilization of
groundwater, they also contributed towards rising subsidy bills. Cumulative
subsidies provided by all states for agricultural consumers increased from Rs. 593.8
billion in 1991-92, when energy sector reforms were started, to Rs. 2380.6 billion in
2004-05 (Table 3). This increase in subsidies has been despite the adoption of
minimum tariff of Rs. 0.50 per unit under the common minimum plan for power
sector reforms. The rising subsidy bills have largely been on the account of political
interference in pricing of electricity for agricultural consumers, and it has been in
the form of either free electricity or waiver of electricity dues.
Table 3. Growth of electricity subsidies for agricultural consumers in India

















Source: (GoI, 2002; Planning Commission, 2002a; GoI, 2004; GoI, 2005a).
Figure 4. Electricity for agriculture consumers in India – agriculture share (%), revenue realization (%)
and changes in average agriculture tariff 1994/95-2001/02 (Source: Planning Commission 2002(a)Understanding and Managing the Water–Energy Nexus 253
Political populism in the energy sector can be classified into two categories –
one, pertains to provision of free electricity, a policy which was followed by states
such as Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and were reintroduced by states
such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu after 2004 state assembly elections.
Maharashtra also provided free electricity for short period in wake of 2004 state
assembly elections and withdrew the scheme within six months of returning to
power. Punjab, which gave free power in 2002, also withdrew in six months, but
recently in 2005, the state government has reintroduced free power in view of
forthcoming state election. Second, measure is in form of waiver of electricity dues,
a policy that has been continuously followed by many states and in recent years,
states such as Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra in 2004 gave waiver
of electricity dues just before state assembly elections. Haryana offered waiver of
arrears with a rider that with regular payment of 10 bi-monthly bills, arrears shall
be reduced by 10% with each payment. While waiver of arrears is not same as
providing free power, but instead is an interim measure of providing relief to
farmers. However, this has resulted in creating a non-payment behavioral pattern
by the farmers, who expect another round of waiver to come in future. For
example, empirical evidence from Karnataka shows that farmers have stopped
paying electricity bills after a waiver was announced before state assembly elections
in 2004.
Discussion
Analysing the scenarios of groundwater, agriculture, and energy sectors and
the implications of the policies on groundwater over-exploitation, policy and
program intervention in the water sector needs to be supported by appropriate
policies of the energy and agriculture sector. Direct management of groundwater
suffers largely due to lack of legislative instruments including low opportunities
for effective implementation of legislative controls (even in states where such
legislations are existing), development of groundwater through right of capture,
political sensitivity associated with its use for agriculture, food security and
livelihoods, and the fact that much of the groundwater development actually takes
place through private capital investments of the farmers. Even in states such as
Andhra Pradesh, which enacted an Andhra Pradesh Water, Land, Trees Act, has
run into institutional barriers and lack of teeth to restrict over-exploitation of
groundwater (Narayana et al., 2005). Given this broader context of the groundwater,
specific intervention can be focused on recharging the aquifers by managing run-
off water from surface irrigation sources and rainfall. These interventions can
provide positive benefits, however, the rate of recharge varies and rate of extraction
is influenced by crop choice and density of pump sets. Energy sector policies and
agriculture policies have to support groundwater interventions. Anecdotal evidence
from watershed management in Madhya Pradesh showed that once the three-year
restriction on digging new bore wells was removed, irrigation pump sets
mushroomed. Even under other watershed management programs, benefits of
groundwater recharge efforts by the community upstream were captured by few
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Energy Options
The current approach in the energy sector has focused on technical and
financial fixes to the problems. However, energy policies are concerned until the
meter side of the pump set. Metering is the most debated aspect, as energy sector
reforms proponents have argued that metering may not only reduce distribution
and commercial losses for the utilities, but also induce efficient pumping and
adoption of efficient pump sets by the farmers (Padmanabhan, 2001). The latter is
assuming that farmer’s would be rational in their approach, and is not likely to
take place unless an overall change is brought in the distribution of electricity
supply – quality, reliability, and time of supply (Reddy, 2000). Benefits of metering
will be largely drawn by the electricity utilities, as it will improve accountability in
the sector, however, there is little buy-in from the farmers. Farmers look at
metering with distrust, as they expect that the otherwise flat tariff would increase
in near future. Farmer’s opposition to metering also stems from the fact that
metering would not allow them to pilfer by under reporting pump capacity.
Pricing of electricity closer to the cost of supply is another common prescription.
Appropriate tariff is the most prudent option, however, electricity pricing for the
agriculture sector follows political logic rather than sound economic principles.
The common quote from an influential politician states that “ Pricing is not just a
matter of people’s willingness to pay. It’s also a matter of politicians’ willingness
to charge”. At the same time, there are other sets of arguments related to pricing
of electricity. Electricity supplies to farmers are in fact, off-peak and highly un-
reliable, and thus does not cost the electricity utilities even the average cost of
supply (Bhatia, 2005). At a larger policy level, since electricity pricing are linked to
political outcomes, tariff rationalization is not likely to be achieved in many states.
The problem is not such much of appropriate tariff, but the inability of the utilities
to do collection. In the recent past, there has been lot of outcry related to provision
of free power. Free power sop runs contrary to the Electricity Act, 2003, which
prescribes a gradual phasing out of cross-subsidies. However, there are several
states which give waiver of electricity dues, and in the absence of revenue
collection, electricity supply virtually becomes free. For example in Karnataka,
where the utilities are not collecting any revenue from agricultural consumers, and
at the same time the farmer are unwilling to pay and hoping for waiver of dues.
In this context, three options of energy side need to be explored further:
• The first is the analysis of the scheme introduced by the State Government in
Haryana in 2005. Instead of giving a one-time waiver of electricity dues, the
government introduced an “Arrear Waiver Scheme.” As per the scheme, 10%
of the arrear would be written off with the continuous payment of each of the
next ten electricity bills on a two-month cycle. If the farmers miss any of the
current payments, the scheme will start all over again. Preliminary observations
indicate that scheme has been quite successful as more than 90% of the farmers
in Bhiwani and Jind districts – districts with highest incidences of default -
have utilized the scheme.
• The second option pertains to adopting a different system for setting electricity
tariff for groundwater utilization. At present, the State Electricity Regulatory
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per unit) for different consumers across the state and based on pooled average
cost of supply. There is no differentiation in the tariff for different regions.
Instead of this pooled average cost of supply, electricity tariff could be fixed
based on the groundwater classification as over-exploited, critical and safe.
This will not only bring two sectors to work together, it will also provide some
accountability towards how groundwater has to be utilized. As part of the
distribution reforms in the electricity sector, multiple distribution utilities
either have been formed or are in the process, which makes it possible to have
groundwater classification based electricity tariff. Regions that are classified as
over-exploited can have higher electricity tariff (flat or metered), when compared
to regions, which are classified as safe. High electricity tariff rate would act as
a deterrent for farmers to grow water intensive crops in over-exploited and
critical areas. In other terms, higher tariff for the over-exploited and critical
areas would be equivalent to an environmental cess, which the farmers in such
regions would have to pay to utilize groundwater. However, implementing
such tariff system requires maturity to think out of the hat by the SERCs/SEBs,
which set the tariff. This will also require a political vision to introduce such
differential tariff system.
• The third option relates to matching energy supply with the irrigation needs of
the farmers. Crop water needs are generally not linear in nature but follow a
pattern closely dictated by crop growth patterns with high water/ energy
requirements during planting and high vegetative growth (Sharma et. al, 2005).
At the core of the nexus, is the mismatch between irrigation needs and energy
availability. Power supply is good and reliable, when the irrigation needs of
the farmers are low, and of inferior quality and in short supply when the
irrigation needs are higher. When the irrigation needs are higher and power
supply is unreliable, farmers are frustrated and opt for options such as
excessive pumping of groundwater, power pilferage and default. These pumping
patterns not only stress the electricity distribution infrastructure, but also
increase commercial losses for the utilities. Matching energy supply with
irrigation needs of the farmers would result in a win-win scenario, as farmers
would be happy and the volume of subsidy would be controlled. However,
this would require significant work at the electricity feeder level by developing
local intelligence mechanisms. Shah et al., (2003) also suggested ‘intelligent
power supply’ in which energy supply pattern is matched with crop water
needs.
Agriculture Options
While managing input subsidies such as those provided by electricity can
result in, to some extent, in efficient utilization of groundwater, but a more direct
approach would come through policy interventions from the agriculture sector.
There are two inter-linked policy issues, which can have direct bearing on
groundwater utilization as well as equitable distribution of food and energy
subsidies. First, policy issue deals with the restructuring of the MSP mostly
targeted to paddy and wheat. Second, policy issue is the procurement policy forShirish Sinha, Bharat R. Sharma and Christopher A. Scott 256
the food grains, which is inter-linked to MSP. Both these policy options have to be
reviewed and implemented concurrently.
• As argued under the agriculture sector, MSP associated with paddy and wheat
accounts for bulk of the food subsidy bill. In the last five years, the MSP prices
for paddy and wheat have increased marginally, but open-ended procurement
norms distort subsidy allocation, as well as encouraging paddy and wheat
cultivation in states, which are increasingly becoming water scarce regions. The
government needs to intervene either by freezing the MSP or by introducing
a time bound phase out of the MSP. This is likely to trigger cropping pattern
shift by the farmers, if the economic returns are no longer attractive. From a
policy perspective, this option again has political implications. MSP restructuring
would be effective, if it is accompanied by providing incentives for alternate
crops, which provide at least similar economic returns as those from paddy
and wheat. It would also require government to strengthen MSP as well as
support them with market access in either domestic markets or international
trade for other cereal crops and oilseeds.
• Restructuring the procurement norms for food grains is inter-linked with the
restructuring of MSP. The current procurement policy is open ended, as there
is no upper limit set. This has distorted procurement from states, which are
increasingly becoming water scarce (Punjab, Haryana, western Uttar Pradesh).
In the last two years, FCI, has made some changes in procurement and it is
now focused on eastern Indian states for procuring paddy (GoI, 2005a).
However, they account for approximately 10% of the total procurement. In
order to restructure the procurement policy, the government might put upper
ceiling of procurement. In other words, the government needs to introduce
fixed quota for each food grain to be procured and gradually reduce the quota
from states such as Punjab and Haryana. Imposing such quota limit is likely to
influence farmer’s decision to undertake cropping pattern change. However,
the government needs to introduce safeguards through incentive and market
linkages to grow other crops.
Conclusions
This paper has discussed role of indirect options pertaining to energy and
agriculture policies simultaneously for efficient utilization of groundwater. While
some of these policy interventions are already under review and implementation,
they require rigorous public debate to find the appropriate balance. Given the
groundwater realities in India, and likely future scenario, it is critical to understand,
that no single policy intervention can solve the problem. Energy policies can play
a role, but their implementation is fraught with political compulsions and their
inherent limitations as a solution in sectors other than energy. Thus, the energy
policies will be able to find solutions for the energy side of the nexus; the energy
policies on their own will have little to offer for the groundwater.
Farmer’s choice of crop is certainly influenced by input subsidies, but they are
influenced by assured prices and market, both of which are provided by the
government’s food subsidy and procurement policies. Procurement policy and
MSP needs to be revamped, not just from reducing fiscal burden on the exchequerUnderstanding and Managing the Water–Energy Nexus 257
and from equity perspective, but long term environmental benefits and livelihoods
security that can be achieved from efficient utilization of groundwater. Both the
indirect policies of energy and agriculture sector needs to be concurrently
approached to bring diversification of agriculture and therefore arresting
groundwater depletion, and safeguarding livelihoods and food security.
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